Together with a handful of countries at the global level, a number of economies in the Andean region stand out by their innovative and rapid advances in the design and implementation of macroprudential financial regulations, that is, regulations that take into account financial risks generated at the systemic level. This paper focuses on three regulatory tools utilized in the region: countercyclical capital requirements, countercyclical loan-loss provisioning requirements, and liquidity requirements. In each case, the specifics of the policy instrument is described and compared across countries. Among the Andean countries, Colombia and Peru have been the most active in terms of implementation of countercyclical macroprudential regulations.
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I. Introduction
This policy brief deals with advances in the Andean countries regarding the implementation of macro-prudential financial regulations; that is, regulations that take into account risks at the systemic level.
The importance of having in place a financial regulatory framework that includes macroprudential regulations was fully recognized during the recent global financial crisis. A central lesson from that episode was that relying on regulations that solely assessed the risks that financial institutions were taking on their individual balance sheets (a micro-prudential approach) was inadequate to preserve financial system stability. The crisis revealed that regulations need to deal with both idiosyncratic (micro) and systemic (macro) risks.
While there are many definitions of what constitute macro-prudential regulations, the main goal of the approach is to minimize the macro costs of a crisis; that is, to limit the eruption of credit crunches derived from a systemic financial crisis. By avoiding credit crunches, macro-prudential regulations aim at minimizing contractions in economic growth. Under this view, aggregate risk depends on the collective actions of financial institutions. A popular conceptualization of the approach, defines systemic risk as having two components: a crosssectional dimension and a time dimension. 1 The cross-sectional dimension recognizes that interconnectedness of the activities of financial institutions and markets generates risk that surpasses the risk characteristics of individual firms. For example, if financial difficulties force an important bank in the system (or a group of banks) to quickly sell assets at fire-sale prices to obtain needed liquidity, the resulting decline in asset prices will hurt the balance sheets of other financial institutions holding those same assets. If the linkages are strong enough, the contraction in assets' values will result in a significant decline in capital and a credit squeeze will follow 2 . What is the macro-prudential approach recommendation to deal with this issue? The answer is for financial institutions to hold large amounts of assets that are not prone to fire-sales; that is, that do not lose liquidity in bad states of the world. Under Basel III, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has translated this recommendation into well-defined ratios for liquidity requirements, providing a list of assets that qualify as high-quality liquid assets.
The time-dimension of the macro-prudential approach acknowledges that aggregate risk varies over time: in good times, when the economy is growing, borrowers' balance sheets 2 look healthy, non-performing loans tend to be low and capital increases. Under these conditions, banks have the incentive to expand credit at a pace that might turn to prove unsustainable when the good times end; that is, unsustainable credit booms might materialize. Likewise, in bad times, non-performing loans increase, capital decreases and banks face financial difficulties, leading to a credit crunch. Sharp reductions in credit growth are associated with economic recessions.
What is the macro-prudential approach recommendation to deal with the problem of timevarying risk? The response is counter-cyclical regulations. Operationally, this recommendation translates into counter-cyclical capital requirements and counter-cyclical provisioning requirements. That is, the recommendation is to accumulate additional (beyond minimum requirements) capital and loan-loss provisions during good times-to contain the build-up of excessive credit risk--to be used during times of financial difficulties-therefore, limiting credit crunches. Along these lines, banks' capital requirements under Basel III recommendations include a counter-cyclical buffer. Although not included in Basel III, the Financial Stability Forum (2009) supports the implementation of counter-cyclical loan-loss provisioning requirements.
Interestingly enough, a number of Andean countries are among those emerging markets that have made most progress in reforming their regulatory frameworks to introduce macroprudential regulations. This document tracks those advances by focusing precisely on the three regulatory tools mentioned above: liquidity requirements, counter-cyclical capital requirements and counter-cyclical loan-loss provisioning requirements. For this purpose the rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the characteristics of credit cycles in the Andean countries and compares them to cycles in other emerging markets. The analysis in this section provides strong support to the relevance of implementing macroprudential regulations in Andean countries. Section III constitutes the core of the paper. This section discusses in detail the specifics of the macro-prudential regulations already in place. When available, the section presents data to show whether observed capital and liquidity ratios meet current recommendations of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision. Comparisons between Andean countries regarding the design of macroprudential regulations are also included in this section. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Credit cycles in the Andean Countries
As discussed in the introduction, macro-prudential regulations can support financial stability and economic growth by playing a significant role in avoiding the formation of unsustainable credit booms and limiting credit crunches. Therefore, a starting point to analyze the use of macro-prudential tools in the Andean countries is to understand the characteristics of credit cycles in the region. As shown in Claessens et al (2011) , recent literature has made important advances in developing methodologies to characterize credit cycles, and has shown that in emerging economies, credit cycles tend to be of longer duration, of higher intensities, and lead to credit collapses and stronger output contractions than in the advanced ones.
Figure 1: Credit Cycles in the Andean Region
Source: Own calculations based on IMF/IFS (2012) In order to characterize credit cycles in the Andean economies we follow the methodology developed by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) to identify credit booms in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. This methodology uses the Hodrick Prescott filter to identify the trend and the cyclical components of real credit, and identifies a boom in credit as an episode in which real credit is growing above its trend by more than a certain threshold 3 . The advantage of this methodology is that unlike procedures that disregard idiosyncratic determinants of volatility, it establishes thresholds that are proportional to a country's own volatility, which means that a credit boom is only identified when real credit grows beyond a limit that is consistent with the country's own history.
Figure 2: Credit Booms
Source: Own calculations for the Andean countries and for the rest of LAC based on IMF data. Data for Asia and Europe is taken from Izquierdo, Loo-Kung, and Rojas Suarez (2012) .. Andean countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Rest of LAC: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Philippines. Europe: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. Figure 1 reports the dynamics of real credit in the five Andean countries studied, where the trend and threshold are computed using the Mendoza and Terrones methodology. The shaded areas identify the boom periods. Credit booms are defined as the period between the quarter in which the real growth rate of credit surpasses the trend and the quarter when it returns to trend, passing through a sub-period in which real credit growth is higher than the threshold. The figure is constructed using quarterly data ranging from the first quarter of 1996 up to the last quarter of 2011. Real credit is defined as the stock of bank credit to the private non-financial sector from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (line 22d) deflated by the consumer price index (line 64).
According to this methodology, there were 8 credit booms in our sample. Two were identified in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, and one in Ecuador and Venezuela. The timing of the credit booms is relatively similar. At the end of the 1990s, a boom was identified in all countries except Venezuela. The second boom identified in Colombia and Peru, and the one in Venezuela took place in the last part of the first decade of the 21 st century. The peak of these booms occurred in the pre-Lehman's period. Figure 2 provides a summary of the credit booms identified in our sample and compares the findings to those of Izquierdo, Loo-Kung and Rojas-Suarez (2012) that use the same methodology to explore credit cycles in other regions of the World. 4 In the figure we plot 4 The emphasis of the analysis in Izquierdo, Loo-Kung and Rojas-Suarez (2012) is on Central American countries.
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Start to Peak Peak to End Peak to Trough the cross-country mean of the cyclical component of real credit in a six-year event window centered at the peak of credit booms in each of the regions considered. Our results suggest that the duration of the boom (understood as the time elapsed since real credit leaves the trend and returns to it after passing through a peak) in Andean countries is longer than in other regions of the world. In Andean countries the duration of a credit boom is 14.8 quarters, while in the rest of LAC it is 10.7 quarters, in Asia 11 quarters, and in Emerging Europe 8.3. This means that in the Andean countries credit booms are about a year longer than in the rest of LAC. Also, both the upturn phase (from the start to the peak) and the downturn phase (from the peak to the end) are longer in the Andean countries relative to other regions in the world.
An additional result is that, in spite of longer duration, at the peak of the boom the average deviation of real credit above trend in Andean countries is smaller than in Asia and Europe. At the peak, real credit is about 15 percent higher than the trend in Andean countries, while the corresponding values for Europe and Asia are 20 percent and 23 percent respectively. The value for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean is slightly lower than for Andean countries.
A very interesting result for the purpose of this paper is that the size of credit adjustments that follows a credit boom is larger in Andean countries (reaching nearly 13 percent below the trend) than in other regions of the World.
The finding that the duration of credit booms is relatively longer than in other regions and that the size of credit adjustment following a boom is also more profound than in other parts of the developing world are indicative of the particular importance for Andean countries of having mechanisms in place to mitigate the formation of booms. The fundamental reason is that there is a strong correlation between real credit and real GDP cycles. Figure 3 , plots the cyclical component of real credit growth and the cyclical component of real GDP growth computed using the same methodology.
While no causal inference can be drawn from these patterns, Figure 3 shows a strong correlation between these variables. Real credit and real GDP cycles move very similarly. Real credit cycles may affect GDP cycles by leading to expansions (contractions) in consumption, investment, and trade when abundant credit is available (scarce). In turn, GDP cycles can also lead credit cycles through demand or risk valuation impacts. Figure 4 , plots the correlation coefficient between the cyclical components of credit and of GDP for a sample of Latin American countries including the Andean ones (in a darker shade). In most countries the correlation between these two variables is high (over 30%) and, as denoted by an asterisk, statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Among the 6 countries in Latin America with the higher correlation coefficients, 4 of them are Andean.
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Figure 3: Real Credit and Real GDP Cycles in the Andean Region
Source: Own calculations based on IMF/IFS(2012)
Figure 4: Correlation Coefficients of Real Credit and GDP Cycles
Source: Own calculations based on IMF/IFS (2012) The fact that credit cycles around booms are particularly long in Andean countries and that the correlation between credit cycles and GDP cycles is quite strong in this region leads naturally to the question of what policy instruments have been designed to prevent the formation of credit booms. In the following section we present a summary of the main policy tools available in these countries. Most of these have been put in place recently and hence it cannot be inferred that, given the information above, they have been ineffective. Their effectiveness should be assessed in the years to come.
III. Macro-prudential Rules in Andean Countries
Albeit important differences between countries, the Andean region has made significant progress in the implementation of macro-prudential regulations. This section focuses on the application of the three most important macro-prudential regulations recommended by international standard-setting bodies 5 : counter-cyclical capital buffers, counter-cyclical loanloss provisioning (also known as dynamic provisioning) and liquidity requirements. These prudential measures, as described in Table 1 , have been adopted in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. This section constitutes the core of the paper. The section presents advances in the Andean countries in implementing each of the three macro-prudential regulations mentioned above.
The section also presents differences between Andean countries in the design of the regulations. Similarities and differences with recommendations from Basel III are also highlighted 6 . Moreover, when data availability allows, the section also assesses whether banks meet the macro-prudential regulations in place. This section concludes with a brief discussion on two other macro-prudential policies that some Andean countries have incorporated to their macro-prudential toolkit: loan-to-value ratios and reserve requirements.
Table 1. Macro-prudential regulations implemented in the Andean countries
A. Countercyclical Capital Buffer Requirements
The Basel Committee on its third Accord 7 has developed a countercyclical capital buffer proposal as a measure to protect the banking sector from periods of excessive credit growth. The recommendation is to build up additional capital buffers to cover future potential losses. This buffer is essentially a disclosed requirement that sits on top (add-on) of the capital conservation buffer and the minimum capital requirement. A positive buffer would be required in normal states of the world, rising during periods of aggregate credit growth and falling in downturns, while a zero buffer will be allowed in all states of the cycle other than in periods of excess aggregate credit growth.
The proposal defines the credit-to-GDP ratio as the reference indicator to activate the buffer buildup. It does not take any aggregate macroeconomic variable (like GDP growth) as an indicator of the cycle. The argument for this preference relies on the fact that fluctuations in output have higher frequency than those of financial cycles associated with serious financial distress, and therefore taking a GDP growth reference could result in unnecessary buffer buildups. 6 The Basel III accord provides proposals for the capital cyclical buffer and the liquidity requirements. 7 The Basel III proposal is taken from "Basel III: Countercyclical Capital Buffer Proposal" (BIS, June 2010), and "Basel III: Guidance for National Authorities Operating the Countercyclical Capital Buffer" (BIS, December 2010). The activation and deactivation rule proposed for the countercyclical buffer depends on the value of the gap between the actual credit-to-GDP ratio and its trend, as follows:
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Where the trend is the sustainable average ratio of credit-to-GDP based on historical experience and calculated through the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The buffer takes a value of zero when is below a certain threshold (L), and increases up to a maximum level when exceeds an upper threshold H. Basel III proposes a discretional countercyclical buffer between 0 and 2.5% of the risk weighted assets (RWA) which should be composed by common equity Tier 1 capital, and gap threshold values of L=2% and H=10%, based on historical banking crises 8 .
As the thresholds depend on the trend estimations, and therefore can differ among methodologies, Basel III proposes general criteria for setting them up: when the credit-to-GDP guide starts to indicate a need to build up capital, L should be low enough so that banks are able to build it up in a gradual fashion before a potential crisis, and high enough so that no additional capital is required during normal times. Conversely, when the credit-to-GDP guide shows no need for additional capital, H should be low enough so the buffer would be at its maximum before a major banking crisis. Finally, Basel III recommendations do not suggest restrictions on distributions of the capital surplus created when the buffer rule is turned off.
Among the Andean countries, only Peru has established the guidelines for a countercyclical capital requirement. Although based on Basel III recommendations, the rule follows a GDP growth reference guide, which adjusts better to the financial system characteristics. This regime is described below.
Peru
The cyclical capital buffer (requerimiento de patrimonio efectivo por ciclo económico) was approved by the Supervisory Authority (Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFPs, SBS) in July 2011. Under this regime banks are required to build up additional regulatory capital above the minimum requirement to offset losses from loan portfolios during the contractive phase of the economic cycle. Its objective is aligned to the Basel III proposal to implement a buffer addon during periods of excess aggregate credit growth.
The methodology applied by each bank to estimate the buffer depends on its availability of models to assess the different parameters needed to calculate the minimum regulatory capital due to credit risk: default probability (DP), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (ETD). There are three possible methodologies: the standard methodology is applied when the bank does not have models to estimate none of these parameters, in which case the SBS applies standards to calculate the minimum regulatory capital required due to credit risk. The basic IRB (Internal Rating Based) methodology is applied when the bank has models to estimate the DP, so the SBS applies standards to assess the LGD and the EAD. The advanced IRB methodology is applied when the bank has models to assess all three parameters.
When the standard methodology is applied, the SBS provides marginal "stress" weights (ponderadores marginales de estrés) that account for the increase in the risk weighted assets (RWA) during a stress scenario. Then the cyclical capital buffer is estimated as the minimum regulatory capital ratio 9 (MRC) times the increase in the RWA after applying the stress weights.
Under the basic IRB model, banks assess the stress RWA using their own estimates for the DP related to the contractive phase of the economic cycle, and the standards for the stress LGD and ETD provided by the SBS. When the advanced IRB model is applied, the three parameters for the stress scenario are estimated individually by each bank. For both models, the cyclical capital buffer is defined as the minimum regulatory capital (MRC) times the difference between the RWA estimated under the stress scenario, RWAS, and the one estimated through the standard rule for the regulatory capital requirement due to credit risk, RWAR:
For example, if a bank has risk weighted assets RWAR =100 million of Nuevos Soles, then no matter which method is used the risk weighted assets under stress scenario, RWAS, should be higher given that it accounts for extra risk. Assuming that RWAS =150 million of Nuevos Soles for this bank and given that the actual minimum regulatory capital as percentage of the risk weighted assets, MRC, is 10%, then the cyclical capital buffer that this bank would be required to build is equal to: million of Nuevos Soles Under this methodology, the cyclical capital buffer of each bank does not need to fall within the range proposed by Basel III (0-2.5% of the risk weighted assets).
a) Activation and Deactivation Rule
The activation and deactivation rules are the same as those of the cyclical provisioning rule described in the following section: banks should accumulate additional capital during the expansionary phase of the economic cycle and are allowed to use a share of it during contractions. In this sense, it differs from the Basel III proposal which involves a credit to GDP guide for activation, which would make the buffer buildup more subject to specificbank's loan portfolio status than to the economic cycle. The argument of the Peruvian authorities to take a different guide relies on the low banking penetration of Peru compared to the developed world. Under these circumstances, a significant increase in the rate of credit growth does not necessarily mean an excess of credit that justifies implementing a cyclical buffer, which in the end would raise the cost of credit, discouraging a healthy expansion. Another difference between Basel III and the Peruvian rule is that the former focuses on individual banks' global exposure of their portfolio (in and outside the country) while the Peruvian rule is based only on developments in local systemic risk (the country's economic cycle).
b) Buildup of the cyclical capital buffer
When the rule activates, banks need to build the cyclical capital buffer up to reach 100% of its value. However, they can request to accumulate only up to 75% of the estimated buffer, under the commitment of capitalizing at least 50% of the net income generated in that year. The buffer estimations should be updated every month while the rule is active. The rule is currently active: A cyclical capital buffer has been legally required since July 2012, and it is expected to be fully met (or 75% under special request) by July 2016 under the following schedule:
c) Usage of the cyclical capital buffer
When the rule is deactivated, banks should extinguish their cyclical provisions before reducing the cyclical capital buffer stock. After consuming the cyclical provisions, 60% of the cyclical capital buffer can be used, provided that the bank has previously accumulated 100% of the buffer while the rule was active. This means that for these banks, 40% of the buffer stock is always held, unless they made a special request for further use to the SBS. If the bank requested to accumulate only 75% of the buffer, then it can only be used until the stock reaches 40% of the total estimated buffer during the last month the rule was active. Table 2 summarizes the comparison between Basel III proposal and the Peruvian regime for cyclical capital buffer:
Table 2. Cyclical capital buffer: Basel III and Peruvian regime comparison
In the Peruvian financial system, all institutions have widely exceeded the minimum Tier 1 capital currently required by Basel III (6%, which comprises 4.5% in common equity): no institution has ratios lower than 7.9%. However, the new regulatory regime which not only requires a countercyclical buffer but also a conservation buffer, both composed by common equity Tier 1 capital, might put pressures over some of these institutions to accumulate extra Tier 1 capital. The Basel III Accord proposes a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and a discretionary countercyclical buffer, which allows national regulators to require from 0% to 2.5% of the RWA during time of high credit growth. Assuming these requirement levels for the Peruvian financial system, institutions would require to build up a minimum regulatory Tier 1 capital of 8.5% (2.5% extra for the conservational buffer and 0% for the cyclical buffer) of the RWA during economic downwards, that could go up to 11% (2.5% extra for countercyclical buffer) in the expansionary part of the cycle 10 (Table 3) .
At the system level, all Peruvian financial institutions, regardless of size, have already exceeded the actual minimum requirement (6%) up to a point that Tier 1 is already over 8.5% of the RWA. This means that they also have no problem in complying with the conservation buffer (Table 3) . However, under the assumption that the countercyclical buffer is set up as 2.5% as recommended by Basel III, a number of institutions would need 10 Taking into account the 2% Tier 2 capital requirement, the Basel III accord would require a total regulatory capital of 8.5% of RWA during downturns and a maximum of 11% during credit expansion. Only up to 60% of the buffer after extinguishing dynamic provisions Protect banking sector from periods of excess credit growth by building up additional capital buffers to cover future potential losses.
I. Similarities
Disclosed requirement that sits on top (add-on) of the capital conservation buffer and the minimum capital requirement.
to build up more Tier 1 capital in order to satisfy the overall 11% maximum Basel III recommendation.
Table 3. Peru: Average capital to risk weighted assets requirements by institution size
Size is defined by the value of assets. For banks: big banks are those with assets greater than 4% of GDP, medium size between 1% and 4% of GDP, and small size lower than 1% of GDP. Big size financial enterprises and municipal saving and lending institutions are those with assets higher than 0.4% of GDP. Rural saving and lending institutions are all small. Source: SBS, own calculations.
At the individual institutions level, only one bank and one rural saving and lending institution will have to accumulate extra Tier 1 capital to satisfy the conservation buffer, as shown in Figure 5 . Under the assumption that the countercyclical buffer is established at 2.5%, as recommended by Basel III, most institutions would already meet those recommendations. However, some other institutions would need to build up more Tier 1 capital during the expansionary phase of the cycle in order to satisfy the overall 11% maximum Basel III recommendation. This group comprises 7 banks, 3 financial enterprises, 1 municipal and all rural saving and lending institutions. 
Figure 5. Institutions currently fulfilling the capital buffer requirements under the assumption of a 2.5% countercyclical buffer (Basel III recommendation)
Source: SBS, own calculations. Figure 6 shows more details of the exercise that compares current accumulation of Tier 1 capital with the recommendations of Basel III for building both conservation and countercyclical buffers. While the Figure shows that most financial enterprises have already surpassed the recommended accumulation of capital, some other institutions would need to build up extra Tier 1 capital in excess of 1.5% of RWA. These numbers, however, are given for reference only since, as discussed above, the Peruvian regulation for countercyclical capital has important differences from the recommendations in Basel III. 
Financial enterprises
The dynamic provisions regime allows banks to build up loan loss provisions when their profits are growing, to provide a cushion during economic downturn. The underlying principle is that provisions should be set in line with long-run, or through-the-cycle expected losses, which are estimated based on past experience and not in terms of the current credit risk.
Under a regular provisioning system, provisions are a function of non-performing loans. Figure 7 shows this feature. During the expansionary phase of the cycle, credit growth accelerates and debtors can easily serve their debt, which translates in low non-performing loans and therefore of regular provisions. Low provisioning efforts reduces even more banks' risk aversion which fuels credit growth. Conversely, during downturns increased risk aversion translates in credit contractions, higher non-performing loans and consequently greater provisioning efforts which feed credit contraction.
Dynamic provisioning breaks this cyclicality by creating a countercyclical provisions buffer which requires accumulating provisions during credit expansions that can be used later during downturns. Hence, dynamic provisions make provisioning efforts more stable and less dependent on the cycle. 
Bolivia
In December 2008, the Supervisory Authority (Autoridad de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, ASFI) established a dynamic provisioning regime (Previsiones Cíclicas) that requires banks to maintain additional provisions which range from 1.05% to 5.80% of total loans depending of the type of debtor and currency denomination. Dynamic provisions are accumulated during good-quality loan performance periods of time, and can be accessed when loan quality significantly deteriorates. Loan quality performance is measured through the Required Ratio of Provisions (Ratio de Previsión Requerida) of the total loan portfolio (RRPT) and of the loan portfolio for the productive sector 12 (RRPP), defined as the average of specific provisions for loans in each risk category weighted by their corresponding shares in the loan portfolio:
∑ ∑
Where k: loan risk category ranging from A (performing loans) to F (defaulted loans)
Ck: share of loan k in total loans
CPk: share of loan k in the loan portfolio to the productive sector y : actual rates of specific provisions applied to loans of category k
Given that accumulation and use of the dynamic provisions buffer depend on the evolution of ratios calculated at the individual bank level, some banks can be building up their buffer at the same time that others are using them. In this sense, systemic risk is not taken into account.
a) Activation rule
Banks can request to access dynamic provisions provided the buffer has been fully fulfilled and any of the two specific provisions ratios increase for 6 consecutive months. Otherwise, banks should maintain the dynamic provisions buffer.
b) Buildup of buffer
Banks need to accumulate dynamic provisions for all performing loans (risk category A) and corporate loans up to C risk category when the 6-month moving average of both ratios start to decrease. The dynamic requirement is established as a percentage of each loan, depending on its type, currency denomination, and risk category for credits to the business sector: the riskier the credit the higher the proportional requirement of dynamic provisioning. Hence, the dynamic provisions buffer is set according to the table 4 percentages: For example, if a bank has provided corporate credits with loan classification B in domestic currency for 100 million of Bolivianos and consumption loans in foreign currency for 200 million of dollars, then the cyclical provision buffer that this bank is required to accumulate is equal to:
Where ER is the exchange rate of dollars to Bolivianos.
c) Usage of buffer
When loan quality deteriorates, specific provisions requirements increase. If deterioration takes place for 6 consecutive months, the stock of dynamic provisions can be used to cover up to 50% of the additional specific provisions during the first 12 months and up to 100%, thereafter. Usage stops when the 6 month moving average of both RRPT and RRPP start to increase. Since then, banks need to replenish 100% of the buffer within a time period equal to the percentage of the buffer used times 51 months. Figure 8 shows that since 2007 regular provisions, specific and generic, have decreased together with non-performing loans, displaying their cyclical condition. Conversely, one year after its implementation dynamic provisions reached around 1% of total loans and since then they have been sustained at this level, acting as a buffer to smooth cyclicality. 
Source: ASFI, own calculations
Colombia
The dynamic provisioning framework (Componente Individual Contracíclico de Provisiones) was established for commercial loans in 2007 and for consumption loans in 2008, which, together, represent about 90% of total banking credit. Under this regime, the Supervisory Authority (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, SFC) requires banks to accumulate additional specific provisions for these two types of credit in order to be accessed during episodes of loan quality deterioration. The dynamic provisions are individually assessed by loan and bank, so that each bank builds them up when its own loan portfolio shows good quality and uses them when quality declines, independently from the country's economic context or other banks' performance. Besides, Colombian regulation also requires generic provisions for at least 1% of the total loan portfolio, which can be used to meet the dynamic provisions requirement.
The loan quality performance is measured by four indicators built at the bank level: (a) the real quarterly change on the B, C, D and E 13 loan portfolio specific provisions, as a measure of portfolio deterioration; (b) the quarterly cumulative specific provisions as percentage of the quarterly cumulative income from interests on loans and leasing, as a measure of efficiency; (c) the quarterly cumulative specific provisions as percentage of the quarterly cumulative gross financial margin, as a measure of fragility; and (d) the year-on-year (yoy) real growth of the gross loan portfolio. 13 The B, C, D and E portfolios are comprised by defaulted loans for 30 or more days. A bank can access the dynamic provisions buffer if all of the following happen simultaneously for three consecutive months: a≥9%, b≥17%, c≤0% or c≥42%, and d<23%; and should accumulate cyclical provisions otherwise.
b) Buildup of buffer
In times of good loan performance, dynamic provisions should be accumulated, calculated for each loan 14 and defined by the sum of two components. The pro-cyclical individual component (Componente Individual Procíclico, PIC) is defined as the expected loss during good performance and calculated as the product of the default probability when loans show good performance (DPA), the loss associated to default (LD) and the asset exposure (Exp) 15 :
The second component of the cyclical provisions, a countercyclical (Componente Individual Contracíclico, CIC), is calculated as the maximum value between the previous month's countercyclical component value adjusted by the change in the loan stock in the same lapse 16 , and the difference between the expected losses during low loan performance times (ELB) and the expected losses in times of good loan performance (ELA).
{ ( ) }
It should be noticed that the accumulation rule allows for reductions on the CIC component of the dynamic provisions if there were loan prepayments which would reduce the asset exposure.
A bank is required to comply with the additional provisions within 6 months after activation of the rule.
c) Usage of buffer
When a bank shows significant loan quality deterioration (the four indicators mentioned above showed a value in the range established simultaneously), usage of the dynamic 14 The two components are calculated by loan, and added up to the bank level to set the cyclical buffer. 15 The default probabilities and the liability exposure have been established by the Supervisory Authority differing by type of portfolio and borrower (size of the borrowing firm in case of commercial loans and usage of the credit in case of consumption). The probability for each type of borrower and credit can have two possible values defined by Matrix A (in times of good loan performance) and Matrix B (in times of low performance) 16 Both the countercyclical component and the liability exposure are calculated on the base of guidelines models authorized by the Supervisory Authority and adapted by each bank.
provisions buffer is allowed through a different methodology to calculate the pro-cyclical and countercyclical components, where the last one allows for reductions in the stock of dynamic provisions. Hence, during a loan quality deterioration cycle, the PIC is calculated separately for grade A loans and lower quality loans, imposing higher accumulation for the last ones:
Where DPB is the default probability in times of low performance.
The CIC is defined as the difference between the CIC accumulated until last month and the maximum value between the CIC adjusted by the loan stock and the stock reduction factor (SRF):
The stock reduction factor represents the "contribution" that each borrower makes to compensate for bank's expenditure in provisions (40% of the PIC corresponding to the loan). This contribution is proportional to each borrower's savings in banks' total savings through CIC:
( ∑ )
If a bank decides to use the dynamic provisions, it can do so for 6 months independently of the indicators' values over this term.
After dynamic provisioning was established it was difficult to distinguish between specific and dynamic provisions given that both were accounted together 17 . Furthermore, given that Colombian regulation allows using generic provisions to meet the dynamic provisions requirement, the implementation of the rule translated in a reduction of the generic provisions similar to the increase in the specific provisions. Figure 9 shows how dynamic provisions fell from 1.0% to 0.4% of the total loans on July 2007 when dynamic provisions for commercial loans were introduced, while the specific provisions increased from 3.1% to 3.7% of total loans. Similar effect had the introduction of the dynamic rule for consumption credits in July 2008.
Figure 9. Colombia: Dynamic rule implementation (% of loans)
Source: Supervisory Authority, own calculations.
After the financial crisis, credit expansion was followed by a drop of non-performing loans which reduced specific provisions. However the dynamic rule activation has assured a buffer which compensated this reduction and led to maintain total provisions at a relative stable level in case of a downturn scenario ( Figure 10 ). Hence, dynamic provisions have been close to 1% since 2010, achieving the goal of making provisions more independent from the cycle. The dynamic provisions were approved by the Supervisory Authority (Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros del Ecuador, SBS) in June 2012, establishing a buffer (Fondo de Provisión Anticíclica) that should be individually set by banks in order to offset the pro-cyclical profile of the loan portfolio specific and generic provisions.
a) Buildup of buffer
The dynamic provisioning regime requires banks to accumulate additional provisions to constitute the buffer during the expansionary phase of the economic cycle, and that can be accessed later during the downturn. The buffer, which follows the Colombian model (based on loan expected loses), has been defined as the difference between the unrealized losses (Pérdidas Latentes, UR) and non-performing loans specific provisions (PR):
The unrealized losses are defined as the product of a factor and the gross loan portfolio (GLP) of the bank:
The coefficient is an average value of the ratio of non-performing loans provisions to loans during the different economic cycle's phases. It also takes into account the ability of different financial institutions to accumulate additional provisions. Hence, these coefficients have been defined for each type of financial institution by the Supervisory Authority according to table 5.
Table 5. Values of by financial institution (%)
Financial institutions started to build up their dynamic provisions buffers in July 2012. The Supervisory Authority has established a calendar to fulfill the requirements by October 2015. By the end of 2012, the buffers should reach 21% of their total requirement.
b) Activation Rule
The dynamic provisions buffer will be accessed to cover the excess of specific provision requirements during the contractive phase of the cycle, when the specific provisions overcome the unrealized losses. However, further regulation has not been established yet, as the financial institutions are currently building up their buffers. The procedures for accessing the dynamic provisions in the contractive phase of the economic cycle have not been established yet, given that the buffer is only planned to be phased in fully by 2015.
Peru
The dynamic provisioning regime (Régimen General de Provisiones Pro-cíclicas) was established in November 2008. Under it, the Supervisory Authority, SBS, requires banks to accumulate additional generic provisions 18 during the expansionary phase of the cycle in anticipation to expected loan losses that typically increase during downturns.
In contrast to other Andean countries' reference for rule activation based on loan quality performance, the Peruvian dynamic provisions regime is activated when GDP growth surpasses a threshold associated with potential output growth. A GDP based-rule is systemic, which means its activation does not depend on a bank's behavior, but on the economy's as a whole. For this reason the effect could be asymmetric on banks: it could be the case that a more prudent bank would have to increase generic provisions 19 .
When the rule is deactivated banks are allowed to use the dynamic provisions buffer to cover additional provisions required by the authorities due to the deterioration of the credit portfolio. The initial rule required banks to fulfill the dynamic provisions buffer by February 2009.
a) Activation Rule
Banks should accumulate dynamic provisions if any of the following events happens:
 The average yoy GDP growth over the last 30 months goes from a level below 5% to one above this threshold.  The average yoy GDP growth over the last 30 months is already above 5%, and the last 12 months average yoy GDP growth is higher than the value registered one year before by 2 percentage points.  The average yoy GDP growth over the last 30 months is already above 5%, and the rule has been deactivated by at least 18 months by the event described in (b).
b) Deactivation Rule
The cyclical provisioning rule is deactivated if any of the following events happens:
 The average yoy GDP growth over the last 30 months goes from a level above 5% to one below this threshold.  The average yoy GDP growth over the last 12 months is lower than the value registered one year before by 4 percentage points.
In any of these cases banks should extinguish their dynamic provisions buffer before using the cyclical capital buffer.
c) Buildup of buffer
When the rule activates, banks should accumulate dynamic provisions in the form of additional generic provisions (i.e. dynamic provisions are only accumulated over performing loans) in percentages that differ by type of credit and debtor. Banks are required to comply with these additional provisions within 6 months after rule activation, according to the following time schedule: 
increase on generic provision to buildup dynamic buffer
For example, if a bank has provided credits to corporates and consumption non revolving credits that require to hold generic provisions of 50 and 100 million of Nuevos Soles, respectively, then the bank is required to accumulate additional generic provisions of:
million of Nuevos Soles d) Usage of the buffer
When the rule is deactivated, the cyclical provisions stock can be used to cover additional specific provisions (i.e. provisions for loans with overdue payments).
The average yoy GDP growth over the last 30 months has been over 5% since October 2005, and consequently this indicator has never ruled the activation or deactivation of the The dynamic provisioning rule was activated in December 2008 although by that time the annual difference in the GDP growth rate of the last 12 months was already under 2% ( Figure 11) . Given the economic deceleration of 2009 this difference went to -4% on June of the same year, and although dynamic provisions should have deactivated since then by rule 2b, it only did in September 2009. With the economic recovery, activation rule 1b was fulfilled in July 2010, and the dynamic rule was activated in October of the same year.
Figure 11. Peru: Dynamic provisioning rule activation and deactivation
Blue circles represent the months when one of the activation or deactivation rules was fulfilled while arrows show the months when dynamic provisioning was effectively activated or deactivated. Source: Central Bank of Peru, own calculations.
Given that the economic deceleration of 2008-2009 did not have the expected negative effects on the banking system, a part of additional provisions (which include both voluntary and dynamic) accumulated during December 2008 -September 2009 were not used during the deactivation phase (October 2009-October 2010). Hence, when the rule was reactivated these provisions accounted for a buffer of US$318 million (22.7% of total provisions). Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of each country's dynamic provisions regime. The Basel Committee on its third accord 20 has developed two standards, each with separate but complementary objectives, to be used in liquidity supervision:
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) promotes short-term resilience of a bank's liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days. The recommendation requires the following ratio to be equal or greater than 100%:
Basel III suggests that all high-quality liquid assets should ideally be central bank eligible for intraday liquidity needs and overnight liquidity facilities. There are two categories of assets included in the stock: "Level 1" assets included without limit, and "Level 2" assets that can only comprise up to 40% of the overall stock after applying haircuts.
Level 1 assets are limited to cash; central bank reserves (provided they can be drawn down in times of stress); and marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, non-central government public sector entities (PSEs), the BIS, the IMF, the EC, or multilateral development banks and satisfying all of the following conditions: (a) have been assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II Standardized Approach, (b) traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration, (c) proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets even during stressed market conditions, and (d) not an obligation of a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities.
Level 2 assets are limited to (a) marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, non-central government PSEs or multilateral development banks that have satisfied the same conditions as Level 1 assets but have been assigned a 20% risk weight under the Basel II Standardized Approach; and (b) corporate bonds and covered bonds that have not been issued by a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities, have not been issued by the bank itself or any of its affiliated entities, have a credit rating from a recognized external credit assessment institution of at least AA-or do not have a credit assessment and are internally rated as having a probability of default corresponding to a credit rating of at least AA-, traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration, and proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets even during stressed market conditions.
Total net cash outflows are calculated as the difference between the outstanding balances of various types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments multiplied by the rates at which they are expected to run off or drawn down 21 under a stress scenario, and the outstanding balances of various categories of receivables multiplied by the rates at which they are expected to flow in, up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows (capped in order to prevent banks from relying solely on anticipated inflows to meet their liquidity requirement):
Basel III recommends specific run-off factors for each type of liability and drawn down rates for each type of committed credit and liquidity facilities (off-balance sheet commitments) to calculate outflows under stress scenario. The last ones are defined as explicit contractual agreements and/or obligations to extend funds at a future date to retail or wholesale counterparties. Run-off and drawn down factors are described in Appendix 1.
The Net Standing Funding Ratio (NSFR) promotes more medium and long term funding of banks' assets by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources. This metric establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity characteristics of an institution's assets and activities over a one year horizon. The NSFR aims to limit over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity and is defined as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding to the required amount of stable funding. The Basel III Agreement recommends this ratio to be over 100%:
Stable funding is defined as the portion of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable source of funds over a one-year time horizon under a stress scenario. The required amount of stable funding for a specific institution is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various types of assets held, off-balance sheet exposures incurred and the activities pursued by the institution.
The available stable funding (ASF) is defined as the total amount of a bank's capital, preferred stock with maturity equal to or greater than one year, liabilities with effective maturities of one year or greater, the portion of non-maturity deposits, term deposits, and wholesale funding with maturities of less than one year that would be expected to stay with the institution for an extended period under a stress scenario. Extended borrowing from central bank lending facilities outside regular open market operations are not considered in this ratio. Each source of funding is assigned to one of five categories depending on its probability to be available under a stress scenario. The amount assigned to each category is multiplied by its probability (ASF factor), and the total ASF is the sum of the weighted amounts. The ASF factors by category are described in Appendix 2.
The required stable funding (RSF) is calculated as the sum of the assets' value held and funded by the bank, multiplied by a specific RSF factor assigned to each asset type, added to the amount of off-balance sheet activity multiplied by its associated RSF factor. The RSF factor applied to each asset or off-balance sheet exposure is the amount of that item that supervisors believe should be supported with stable funding. For example, assets that are more liquid and available to act as a source of extended liquidity in the stress environment, receive lower RSF factors (require less stable funding). Each asset is assigned to one of seven categories and multiplied to the RSF factor applied to that category, as described in Appendix 2. The total RSF is the sum of the weighted amounts.
Among the Andean countries, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador have established liquidity requirements. While Colombia and Peru follows Basel III recommendations, the Ecuadorian regime was established in 2002, much earlier than the third Accord, and consequently it differs from its proposal. These rules are described below.
Colombia
Liquidity requirements for the financial system were established by the Supervisory Authority (SFC) in November 2009 under the "Sistema de Administración de Riesgo de Liquidez" (SARL) aimed to measure and control the liquidity risk associated to each bank's activities, both in and off-balance sheet. Under this regime, the SFC has established two equivalent liquidity risk indicators (Indicadores de Riesgo de Liquidez, LRI), both of them monitored every 7 and 30 calendar days. The first one (LRIA) is set as the difference between liquid assets adjusted by "market liquidity" and exchange risk (ALA), and the estimated net liquidity requirement (NLR) for 7 and 30 calendar days. The accumulated LRIA for 7 and 30 days cannot be negative. The second indicator (LRIR) is the ratio between these two components, and it is equivalent to the LCR recommended by the Basel III Accord, with some country specific adjustments. The regulation establishes that this ratio has to be equal to or greater than 100%.
The Colombian liquidity requirements aim to assure banks' short-term funding over a stress scenario, but does not control for medium term liquidity. Hence, Colombia does not have an indicator equivalent to the net standing funding ratio (NSFR) proposed by the Basel III Accord.
Table 8. Basel III and Colombian high-quality liquid assets definitions
The adjusted liquid assets (ALA) are composed by two categories: high quality liquid assets included without limit, and other liquid assets that can only comprise up to 3/7 of the overall ALA stock after applying market and exchange risk haircuts.
The high quality liquid assets category is equivalent to the Basel III "Level 1" liquid assets, although it is a more restrictive indicator since it is limited to cash, central bank reserves and marketable securities representing claims on the central bank. Marketable high quality securities, including sovereign bonds of any maturity, adjusted by 30 days haircuts for exchange rate risk (applied to those assets denominated in foreign currency) and market risk 22 (to control for potential raises in the interest rate or liquidity risk) are only included as other assets in ALA. The definition of high quality liquid assets used to be even more restrictive until December 2011 when the SFC allowed reserves held in the Central Bank to 22 Equal to the haircuts applied by the Central Bank different securities used for its repo operations equivalent to 30 and 33 calendar days, which are updated and published in its website. For other securities, banks should apply a run-off factor of 20% over their market value.
Basel III Colombia
Level 1 liquid assets (up to 100%)  High liquidity assets (up to 100% be accounted. It is also important to mention that Basel III "Level 1" and "Level 2" assets only include marketable securities if they have been assigned a 0% and 20% risk weight, respectively, under the Basel II Standardized approach, or corporate bonds as long as they achieve certain credit rating level. The Colombian regime doesn't mention these restrictions and place all high quality marketable securities as "other liquid assets", except for those from the central bank. Table 8 summarizes the differences between Basel III and Colombian legislation for the LRIR numerator:
The estimated net liquidity requirement (NLR) is calculated for 7 and 30 calendar days and is equivalent to the Basel III total net cash outflows. It is defined as the difference between the outstanding balances of various types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments multiplied by the rates at which they are expected to run off or drawn down in a stress scenario, and the outstanding balances of various categories of receivables multiplied by the rates at which they are expected to flow in up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows.
Unlike the Basel III proposal, the NLR is estimated by using non-fixed and non-source depending run-off factors to adjust the non-fixed term liabilities or off-balance sheet commitments. These factors are estimated by each bank based on the historic monthly variation of its liabilities (or commitments) stock since 1997. For those institutions with a shorter data base than 10 years, the run-off rates applied cannot be lower than 10%.
The run-off factors definition does not follow the Basel III recommendations as the latter would have implied run-off rates of 75% or 100% for those banks which have public entities or big firms as main sources of funding. However, previous stress scenarios for Colombia system have shown that those deposits are stable, and therefore should not be subject to high run-off factors.
Over the last years, Colombia has fulfilled the liquidity requirements, as can be seen in Figure 12 . The 30 days LRIA has been positive, and showed an increase on December 2011 when the legislation changed to add reserves held in the Central Bank as part of the highquality liquid assets. After that episode, the LRIA has decreased but it is still above 10% of the illiquid assets. Furthermore, a stressed LRIA built by the Central Bank, under the assumption of maximum historic run-off drawn-down factors since 2009, also shows enough liquid assets to satisfy the 30 days liquidity requirement.
Figure 12. Colombia: 30 days LRI evolution and stress scenario
The left hand graph shows the last 4 weeks moving average values for the 30 days LRI, while the right hand graph shows the values for the LRI at the end of the month. Source: Central Bank Stability Financial Report (September 2012).
Peru
Before the Basel III Accord, the Peruvian financial regulation was limited to liquidity risk control over daily ratios of liquid assets to short-term funding, both in domestic and foreign currency. However, the SBS has recently pre-published a new rule for liquidity risk management (Reglamento de Gestión de Riesgo de Liquidez) which introduces two new indicators: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (Ratio de Cobertura de Liquidez, LCR) to assure enough high quality liquid assets over a 30 calendar days stress scenario, and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (Ratio de Fondeo Neto Estable, NSFR) to prevent banks from covering medium and long term assets with short term funding. The high-quality liquid assets, expected inflows and outflows for the next 30 days, limits and implementation calendar for the LCR have been defined on the pre-published norm, while the NSFR has only been set as reference and without defined dates for implementation. Hence, the new liquidity risk management for the Peruvian financial system involves the following meters:
Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): this ratio aims to assure an adequate level of high quality liquid assets that can be cashed to satisfy liquidity needs on a 30 calendar day's horizon under a stress scenario. The LCR involves the same concepts as the Basel III proposal, but the ratio is differently set. The SBS has established a minimum LCR requirement of 100%:
The first implementation phase for the LCR is programmed from December 2013 to December 2014, with a less restrictive minimum requirement of 80%, which will progressively rise to 100% by January 2016. Furthermore, this requirement does not apply to dic-11 ene-12 feb-12 mar-12 abr-12 may-12 jun-12 jul-12 ago-12 30 days IRL stressed 30 days IRL Stress scenario LRI effect the public banking system, financial institutions for small and medium enterprises (EDPYMES) and those institutions with a ratio of deposits to total liabilities lower than 15%, unless their assets represent more than 1% of the total system assets.
In contrast to the Basel III proposal, high-quality assets are not divided by levels and are composed by cash, reserves in the central bank and other institutions of the financial system with residual maturity shorter than 30 days, overseas reserves in foreign banks, and marketable high quality securities from the central bank and sovereigns with investment grade qualification. The Peruvian definition might be less restrictive than that of the Basel III proposal as it includes other reserves than those in the central bank, but more restrictive as it does not include marketable securities from corporates but only from central bank and sovereigns. However, it is important to mention that banks currently hold zero reserves other than those in the Central Bank, making the Peruvian definition de facto more restrictive than the Basel III one. Table 9 presents a summary of the differences on high-quality assets definition: The second component on the LCR numerator, next 30 days inflows, comprises income from performing loans and any other accounts receivable with residual maturity shorter than 30 days, while the next 30 days outflows comprises those liabilities and accounts payable with due date in the next 30 days, and off-balance sheet commitments regardless of their due date. This set up differs from Basel III as outflows are not estimated for a stress scenario using run-off and drawn down rates, but are calculated taking into account the actual expected outflows from commitments due in the next 30 days. In addition, all off-balance commitments regardless of its maturity are considered outflows while Basel III allows for drawn down rates lower than 100% for specific off-balance commitments (Appendix 1).
Keeping in mind the differences in each component, we can compare the LCR ratio for the banking system as implemented by the Peruvian regulation to that which Peru would have had if it had exactly adopted the Basel III LCR. In the first place, table 11 shows that all the banks but those associated with a retail store have already fulfilled the LCR requirement as stated by the Peruvian regulation. Although banks associated with a retail store are below the requirement, it is important to clarify that these banks are subject to additional requirements (beyond those imposed on the rest of the banking system) to prevent downturn effects. As such, dynamic provisions for their credits are the highest of the system. If the LCR is converted to meet the Basel III proposal, then the ratio would be even higher than 100% for all the banks, with the exception of those associated with retail stores. Therefore, the Peruvian banking system fully complies with the Basel III -30 day liquidity requirement defined by the LCR. This result is even stronger when considering that the Peruvian high-quality liquid assets definition is more restrictive than that of Basel III and the 30 days outflows definition is broader as it assumes 100% draw down rates for all offbalance commitments.
Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): its objective is to assure long term assets to be funded with at least a minimum proportion of stable liabilities. It has been defined as the Net Stable Funding Ratio recommended by Basel III, but its components and requirements have not been defined yet.
It is important to mention that other liquidity requirements, implemented previous to the new rules for liquidity risk management, are still enforced as part of the actual regulation. These requirements involve the following meters:
Liquidity ratio: both in domestic (LRDC) and foreign (LRFC) currencies, calculated on a daily basis and defined as liquid assets over short term funding. The minimum requirements for these ratios are 8% and 20%, respectively. These limits increase to 10% and 25%, respectively when the deposits concentration (debt with 20 main clients as percentage of total deposits) is higher than 25%.
High liquidity in the Peruvian financial system has led institutions to widely fulfill these requirements both in domestic and foreign currency (table 12) , mainly in the banking system, but also in other financial institutions: BCRP), the investment in short term securities issued by the Central Bank (CD BCRP, only denominated in domestic currency) and public sovereign bonds (or global bonds in case of foreign currency denomination), as percentage of the liquid assets. The limit for the minimum requirement in domestic currency is 5% while the one in foreign currency is not specified.
Like the LCR, limits to the LIR does not apply to the public banking system, financial institutions for the small and medium enterprises (EDPYMES) and those institutions which ratio of deposits to total liabilities is lower than 15%, unless their assets represent more than 1% of the total system assets. For the first level LSI, the numerator is composed by cash, Central Bank reserves, and marketable and unrestricted securities which represent claims on government and the private sector with maturity up to 90 days. The second level index's numerator, , adds to marketable and unrestricted securities which represent claims on the government and the private sector with maturity from 91 days to 180 days, and held-to-maturity securities with maturity up to 180 days. Both definitions differ from Basel III high-quality liquidity assets which do not comprise marketable securities from the private sector, unless they have certain credit rating, and held-to-maturity securities.
The first level LSI's denominator, , is composed by call deposits, term deposits with maturity up to 90 days, wholesale funding from financial corporates, multilateral developments banks, PSEs, and subordinated debt with maturity up to 90 days. The second level LSI's denominator, , adds to the first level one restricted deposits, term deposits with maturity longer than 90 days, as well as wholesale funding from financial corporates, multilateral developments banks, PSEs, and subordinated debt with maturity longer than 90 days.
As a previous step to LSI1L and LSI2L requirements, the SBS defines the weighted average volatility of a bank's main funding sources (V). The main funding sources stock (Stock) is composed by call, savings, term and restrictive deposits, wholesale funding from financial corporates, multilateral development banks and PSEs. V is calculated as the standard deviations of a 30 days series of the natural logarithm of this Stock's 90 days percentage change, as follows:
The regime establishes that LSI1L and LSI2L should be greater than 2 and 2.5 times the weighted average volatility of a bank's main funding sources, respectively. Minimum requirements over the two indexes have to be simultaneously met. Additionally, the second level liquid assets ( ) should be equal or greater than 50% of the term deposits with maturity up to 90 days held by the main 100 banks' clients. This requires banks with high deposit concentration to have a bigger buffer to face liquidity risk.
If a bank's weekly average of LSI1L does not meet the requirement, the bank cannot increase its loans portfolio. If it does not meet the LSI2L requirement for two consecutive weeks, or for four weeks during a 90 days period of time, the bank should elaborate a contingency plan to show SBS concrete actions aimed to meet the requirement. Table 14 displays the main differences between this regime and Basel III proposal: 
D. Other macro-prudential regulations implemented in the Andean countries
Banking systems in the Andean region have been subject to other regulations which have allowed offsetting procyclicality. Though not an essential part of this document, the following tables summarize characteristics of two instruments: legal reserves requirements and loan-to-value limits. The first one has been subject to changes, becoming in some cases a countercyclical instrument, while the second one, although set as a fixed ratio, has imposed limits to credit expansion.
Table 15. Legal reserves requirements in Andean counties
Basel III Ecuador -Ratios: high-quality liquid assets/net cash outflows -Ratio: liquid assets/ short term funding available stable funding/required stable funding -Liquidity measures for 30 days and 1 year -Liquidity measures for 90 and 180 days -High-quality liquid assets comprise marketable securities -Liquid assets comprises marketable securities from from sovereigns, central bank, PSEs and multilaterals the public and private sector as long as they have Level 2 high-quality assets also comprises corporate maturities up to 90 or 180 days, depending on the as long as they satisfied several liquidity conditions ratio -High-quality liquid assets do not comprise any type of -High-quality liquid assets comprise held-to-maturity held-to-maturity securities securities from private and public sector when maturity is under or equal to 180 days 
IV. Concluding Remarks
Albeit significant differences between countries, the Andean region stands out as relatively well advanced in the implementation of macro-prudential regulations. The dynamics of their credit cycles-where credit booms are relatively of longer duration and credit contractions are deeper than in other parts of the developing world-support their choice for this type of financial regulations.
An important feature of the macro-prudential regulatory framework implemented by Andean countries is that these countries have adapted the recommendations of international setting bodies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to their countries' particular characteristics. For example, in implementing countercyclical capital requirements, the Peruvian authorities have set a rule that is conditioned to the behavior of GDP growth. This differs from Basel III, where the recommendation is that the rule be determined by the behavior of credit to GDP ratio. The Peruvian choice is justified on the basis of very low levels of financial intermediation; a situation very different from that in advanced economies.
The concept and utilization of liquidity requirements, another key macro-prudential regulation, is not new in the region. Indeed, countries like Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have been using this type of policy as a tool for ensuring financial stability for a long time now. What is new is the incorporation of Basel III recommendations regarding the definition of what constitutes high-quality liquidity; that is, assets that don't lose value during times of financial difficulties. The process of reform in this area has just started in the region. Data availability is limited to assess whether countries in the region meet the Basel III standard on liquidity. As this paper shows, however, Peru and Colombia fully comply with the Basel recommendations.
Countercyclical (dynamic) loan-loss provisioning is utilized by four of the five countries in the region: Bolivia, Colombia Ecuador and Peru. Indeed, the region leads Latin America in the implementation of this regulation. There is no such a thing as a typical design for dynamic provisioning in the Andean region. Indeed, as shown in this paper, countries' rules differ significantly. Whether any given system is superior to the others is a topic beyond the scope of this paper, but one that certainly needs to be better understood. These findings are quite encouraging, in addition to those highlighted by Galindo, Rojas Suarez and del Valle (2011) that show that in the region the quality of capital also follows the suggestion of the Basel committee in its third accord, but there is still a long way to go, especially since not all countries have implemented all regulations. In addition, an important reason to avoid complacency is that most of the new regulations are yet untested precisely because they have been recently implemented. To a certain extent, the exception is dynamic provisioning, which have been in place in several countries since 2008 (2007 in Colombia). However, there is not sufficient empirical work to assess the efficacy of this type of regulation. Additional research in this area is certainly needed. By presenting and comparing the current state of macro-prudential regulations in the Andean countries, we hope that this paper motivates further analysis.
